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SECOND-AMENDMENT SCRUTINY:
FIREARM ENTHUSIASTS MAY WIN THE
BATTLE BUT ULTIMATELY LOSE THE
WAR IN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V.
HELLER
INTRODUCTION
In Parker v. District of Columbia (Parker I]),' the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit became the first federal
appeals court in the United States to strike down a gun-control law as
an unconstitutional infringement of the Second Amendment to the
United States Constitution. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit became only
the second federal appeals court to explicitly interpret the Second
Amendment as protecting an individual right to possess firearms for
private use.2 On November 20, 2007, the Supreme Court granted the
District of Columbia's petition for a writ of certiorari.3 Thus, after a
sixty-nine-year hiatus, the scope of the Second Amendment will once
again be an issue before the Supreme Court.a
The debate surrounding the Second Amendment has largely
focused on the nature of the protected right-i.e., whether the right is
individual or collective in nature. Lost in the morass of this debate is
I 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), affd sub noma. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008).
2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was the first federal appeals court to
expressly interpret the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right to possess firearms
for private use. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
3 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645, 645 (2007). The Supreme Court limited
its review to: "Whether the following provisions-D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a),
and 7-2507.02-violate the Second[-]Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated
with any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private
use in their homes?" Id
4 The Supreme Court has not interpreted the Second Amendment since United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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a question of paramount importance if the Supreme Court endorses
the individual-rights interpretation: what level of scrutiny should
courts apply against gun-control laws? An individual right to possess
firearms for private use would not be absolute; like most individual
rights it would undoubtedly be subject to regulation. Thus, the
(largely ignored) corollary question to an individual-rights
interpretation asks what level of scrutiny courts should apply to
determine the constitutionality of gun-control laws: rational-basis
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, or some other type of
judicial scrutiny.
Applying these standards, a gun-control law is constitutional if: (1)
under rational-basis scrutiny, "it is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose"; (2) under intermediate scrutiny, "it is
substantially related to an important government purpose"; and (3)
under strict scrutiny, "it is necessary [i.e., narrowly tailored] to
achieve a compelling government purpose."5 In the realm of
gun-control laws, the government purpose will "typically be some
variation on the theme of public safety-prevention of the death of or
injury to innocent people."6 So long as it is not pretextual, the
government's public-safety purpose will always satisfy the "ends"
prong of each standard-in other words, such a purpose will always
be compelling. Thus, the importance of applying one standard or the
other is realized in the "means" prong. Under rational-basis scrutiny,
the gun-control law need only be a reasonable means of achieving the
government's public-safety purpose; under intermediate scrutiny, the
law must be more than a reasonable means; and, under strict scrutiny,
the law must be the least-restrictive means.7
As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky observes, "The assumption
in the debate seems to be that [under] an individual [-]rights
approach [courts would apply] strict scrutiny ...[to] appraise the
constitutionality of gun[-]control measures. But there is no reason
why this must necessarily be so."8 Looking to state constitutional law
as a guidepost, 9 no state's judiciary applies a strict standard of
5 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 540-41
(3d ed. 2006).
6 Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095,
1132 (2000).
7 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 540-41. Another important distinction between the
three standards is that, under rational-basis scrutiny, the challenger of the law bears the burden
of proof-under both intermediate and strict scrutiny, the government bears the burden of proof.
Id. at 540-42.
8 Erwin Chemerinsky, Putting the Gun Control Debate in Social Perspective, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 477,484 (2004).
9 State constitutional law is particularly useful because as of 1989 forty-three states had
constitutional provisions guaranteeing an individual right to bear arms. See Robert Dowlut,
1424 [Vol. 58:4
SECOND-AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
scrutiny against gun-control laws. ° Rather, the judiciary of every
state that has considered the issue applies a "reasonable-regulation"
standard.1 This reasonable-regulation standard is not rational-basis
scrutiny, but the distinction is slight and, in operational effect,
negligible. The only two federal appeals courts to consider the issue
applied what appears to be a strict-scrutiny-like standard.
12
The importance of this level-of-scrutiny question cannot be
overstated. If the Supreme Court endorses the individual-rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment but then chooses to subject
that right to the reasonable-regulation standard-under which nearly
all gun-control laws survive judicial review-firearm enthusiasts will
have effectively won the battle but lost the war. Alternatively, if the
Supreme Court interprets the Second Amendment as protecting an
individual right, and then attaches a strict standard of scrutiny
(requiring gun-control laws to be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest), the right itself will be less illusory,
though by no means absolute.
This Comment will first trace the path of District of Columbia v.
Heller'3 from the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, through the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, and up to the United States Supreme
Court. 14 This Comment will then examine the Second-Amendment
standard-of-scrutiny spectrum-as articulated by two federal courts,
numerous state courts, various amici curiae in Heller, and several
Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 59, 59 n.2 (1989).
Wisconsin added an individual-rights provision in 1998. See WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25. As a
result, the state courts have had an opportunity to consider the corollary question at issue: what
level of scrutiny should courts apply to gun-control laws? In contrast, only two federal appeals
courts have interpreted the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right. See Parker v.
District of Columbia (Parker 11), 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), affd sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir.
2001). Therefore, most federal courts have not yet had an opportunity to consider the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply against gun-control laws.
I See State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328, 337 (Wis. 2003) ("If this court were to utilize a
strict scrutiny standard, Wisconsin would be the only state to do so.").
II See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 686
n.12 (2007) (citing state-court precedent endorsing the reasonable-regulation standard from
courts in Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). But see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Guns and Gay Sex: Some
Notes on Firearms, The Second Amendment, and "Reasonable Regulation," 75 TENN. L. REV.
137, 138 (2007) (arguing that "[Winkler's] statement, while not exactly inaccurate, is
incomplete").
12 See Parker H, 478 F.3d at 399; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261.
13 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
14 At the time of this Comment's completion in May 2008, the Supreme Court had heard
oral argument in Heller and was scheduled to decide the case in June 2008.
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scholars. Finally, this Comment will argue that the Supreme Court
should recognize the Second Amendment as a fundamental right, and
require courts to apply strict scrutiny against gun-control legislation.
I. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
The case now before the Supreme Court, District of Columbia v.
Heller, began as Parker v. District of Columbia (Parker /)5 in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
A. Parker I
In Parker I, six D.C. residents brought suit in federal district court
challenging the constitutionality of three D.C. gun-control laws.' 6 All
six plaintiffs "wish[ed] to possess a handgun or an assembled long
gun in their homes for self-defense but d[id] not do so because they
'fear[ed] arrest, criminal prosecution, and fine."",17 Of the six
plaintiffs, Dick Anthony Heller was the only one who "applied for
and was denied a registration certificate to own a handgun."' 18 Heller
works as a guard at the Federal Judicial Center and carries a handgun
while on duty-he wished to possess a handgun within his home. 19
The plaintiffs argued the D.C. gun-control laws violated their
"fundamental individual right to bear arms" under the Second
Amendment.20 The district court rejected this argument, finding there
is no "individual right to bear arms separate and apart from service in
the Militia. '21 "[B]ecause none of the plaintiffs have asserted
membership in the Militia," the court reasoned, "plaintiffs have no
viable claim under the Second Amendment ... ,22 Thus, the court
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. And, because the district court
rejected the individual-rights interpretation of the Second
15 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370, affd sub noma.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
16 Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 103-04. The plaintiffs challenged section 7-2502.02(a)(4)
of the D.C. Code, which effectively bans the registration of handguns; section 7-2507.02 of the
D.C. Code, which requires that all lawfully-owned firearms be kept unloaded and disassembled
or bound by a trigger lock or similar device; and section 22-4504 of the D.C. Code, which
prohibits carrying a pistol without a license. Id.; see also D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4),
7-2507.02, 22-4504 (LexisNexis 2001).
17 Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (quoting Complaint at 1, 3, 5, 6, Parker 1, 311 F.
Supp. 2d 103 (No. CIV.A.03-0213 EGS)).
1S Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 374 ("The District, in refusing his request, explicitly relied on
D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4).").
19 Id. at 373-74.
20 Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
21 Id. at 109.
22 Id.
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Amendment, it did not reach the issue of what standard of scrutiny
should apply against the D.C. gun-control laws.
B. Parker II
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's decision.23
Judge Silberman first determined Heller was the only plaintiff with
standing to challenge the D.C. gun-control laws because only Heller
"ha[d] applied for and been denied a registration certificate to own a
handgun. '24 "[T]he formal process of application and denial, however
routine, [made] the injury to Heller's alleged constitutional interest
concrete and particular.,
25
Judge Silberman then addressed the nature of the right protected
by the Second Amendment. He examined the text, history, structure,
and context of the Amendment. He also discussed the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Miller,26 as well as the Supreme
Court's "other statements on the Second Amendment., 27 Judge
Silberman's discussion culminated when he defiantly declared,
"[T]he Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and
bear arms. 28 In doing so, the D.C. Circuit became only the second
federal appeals court to hold that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right-and the first to strike down a gun-control law on
Second-Amendment grounds.
Judge Silberman then turned to whether the D.C. gun-control laws
violated Heller's Second-Amendment rights. The District argued that
even if the Second Amendment protects an individual right, the
handgun regulations were still constitutional because the Second
Amendment does not cover modem handguns. 29 Judge Silberman
rejected this argument, stating that "the District's claim runs afoul of
Miller's discussion of 'Arms.',, 30 He interpreted Miller as having set
forth a test to determine which types of weapons fall under the
Second Amendment's protective umbrella. The Miller test has two
prongs: to enjoy Second-Amendment protections, a particular weapon
(1) must "[bear] a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia,' because [the weapon was one
of] the very arms needed for militia service"; and (2) must "be
23 Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 373.
24 Id. at 376.
25 Id.
26 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
27 Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 391.
28 Id. at 395.
29 Id. at 397.
30 Id.
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personally owned and 'of the kind in common use at the time."' 31
Applying this test, Judge Silberman concluded the term "Arms" in the
Second Amendment encompasses modem handguns.32
Judge Silberman then proceeded to articulate the appropriate
standard of scrutiny to apply against the D.C. gun-control laws. He
stated, "The protections of the Second Amendment are subject to the
same sort of reasonable restrictions that have been recognized as
limiting, for instance, the First Amendment., 33 In other words, it is
reasonable to impose time-place-or-manner-type restrictions on an
individual's Second-Amendment rights so long as the restrictions are
narrowly tailored to achieve the (compelling) government interest.34
Under Judge Silberman's formulated standard, narrowly-tailored
time-place-or-manner restrictions do not violate Second-Amendment
rights so long as they "promote the government's interest in public
safety... [without] impair[ing] the core conduct upon which the right
was premised.
3 5
Having articulated the appropriate standard of review, Judge
Silberman then applied that standard to each of the D.C. gun-control
laws to determine whether it was constitutional. First, he addressed
section 7-2502.02(a)(4) of the D.C. Code, which effectively bans the
registration of handguns. 36 The District argued the prohibition did not
implicate the Second Amendment because it only bars one specific
type of firearm-handguns.37 Judge Silberman characterized this
31 Id. at 398 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79).
32 Id at 397-98.
There can be no question that most handguns (those in common use) fit that
description then and now.
The modem handgun-and for that matter the rifle and long-barreled shotgun-
is undoubtedly quite improved over its colonial-era predecessor, but it is, after all, a
lineal descendant of that founding-era weapon, and it passes Miller's standards.
Id
33 Id. at 399 (emphasis added) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)).
34 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
[T]he government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner
of protected speech, provided the restrictions "are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information."
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
35 Parker H, 478 F.3d at 399.
36 D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2001).
31 Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 400.
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argument as "frivolous, '38 and admonished that a ban on all handguns
is a prohibition, not a regulation. 39 He reasoned, "Once it is
determined-as we have done-that handguns are 'Arms' referred to
in the Second Amendment, it is not open to the District to ban
them."
4
Second, Judge Silberman addressed section 22-4504, which
prohibits carrying a pistol without a license.4' Under this provision, if
a person has a lawfully registered firearm and wishes to carry that
firearm anywhere in the District-whether inside or outside the
home-that person "must apply for and obtain an additional license
from the Chief of Police. 42 The Chief of Police has "complete
discretion to deny license applications." 4  Heller challenged this
provision to the extent that it prohibited him from moving his
handgun around within the confines of his house-he "[did] not claim
a legal right to carry a handgun outside his home." 44 Judge Silberman
determined this regulation is unreasonable because it effectively
"negate[s] the lawful use upon which the right was premised-i.e,
[sic] self-defense. 45
Third, Judge Silberman addressed section 7-2507.02, which
requires that all lawfully owned firearms "be kept 'unloaded and
disassembled or bound by trigger lock or similar device, unless such
firearm is kept at [a] place of business, or while being used for lawful
recreational purposes within the District of Columbia.'''46 There is no
self-defense exception to the unloaded-and-disassembled-or-bound-
by-a-trigger-lock requirement-it was on this basis that Heller
challenged the provision. He did not object to ordinarily keeping his
handgun unloaded or even bound by a trigger lock. He merely
claimed the right to possess (and use) a "functional" firearm to defend
himself against "a threat to life or limb. 47 The District tried to justify
the provision's broad language by arguing that a judge would read a
self-defense exception into the statute.48 Judge Silberman rejected this
argument, countering that "judicial lenity cannot make up for the
38 Id.
39 Id. ("'To exclude all pistols ... is not a regulation, but a prohibition, of... "arms"
which the people are entitled to bear."' (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Kerner, 107
S.E. 222, 225 (N.C. 1921))).
40 Id.
41 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4504 (LexisNexis 2001).
42 Parker If, 478 F.3d at 400.
43 Id.
44 Id
45 Id
46 Id, at 400-01 (alteration in original) (quoting D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02).
47 Id at 401.
48 Id
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unreasonable restriction of a constitutional right.' 49 He determined
that section 7-2507.02 was unconstitutional because it "prohibit[ed]
... the lawful use of handguns for self-defense."
50
C. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
On November 20, 2007, the Supreme Court granted the District of
Columbia's petition for a writ of certiorari. 51 The Supreme Court
limited its review to "Whether the following provisions-D.C. Code
§§ 7-2502(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02-violate the
Second[-]Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with
any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other
firearms for private use in their homes?"52 On March 18, 2008, the
Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case.53 The Court is
scheduled to decide the case in June 2008. In doing so, the Court
could determine not just the nature of the right that the Second
Amendment guarantees, but also the appropriate standard of scrutiny
to apply against gun-control laws.
II. THE SECOND-AMENDMENT STANDARD-OF-SCRUTINY SPECTRUM
The full panoply of potential Second-Amendment scrutiny
standards-as articulated by two federal courts, numerous state
courts, various amici curiae in Heller, and several scholars-includes
strict scrutiny, semi-strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, reasonable-
regulation scrutiny, and rational-basis scrutiny.
A. Strict Scrutiny
To date, only two federal circuit courts have articulated a
Second-Amendment standard of scrutiny: The Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Emerson54 and the D.C. Circuit in Parker H. Both courts
endorsed a heightened level of scrutiny resembling strict scrutiny. In
addition, Roy Lucas, an independent scholar, argues that strict
scrutiny is the appropriate standard.55 And the National Rifle
49 Id,
50 Id.
51 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007).
52 Id.
53 See Transcript of Oral Argument, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/
argument transcripts/07-290.pdf.
- 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
55 See Roy Lucas, From Patsone & Miller to Silveira v. Lockyer: To Keep and Bear Arms,
26 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 257 (2004).
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Association's ("NRA") amicus brief in Heller urges the Supreme
Court to subject gun-control laws to a strict standard of scrutiny.56
1. United States v. Emerson
In Emerson, the Fifth Circuit articulated and applied a heightened
standard of scrutiny resembling strict scrutiny. The Fifth Circuit
stated,
Although, as we have held, the Second Amendment does
protect individual rights, that does not mean that those rights
may never be made subject to any limited, narrowly tailored
specific exceptions or restrictions for particular cases that are
reasonable and not inconsistent with the right of Americans
generally to individually keep and bear their private arms as
historically understood in this country.57
This standard draws upon the language of strict scrutiny-"narrowly
tailored"-and implicitly measures the constitutionality of Second-
Amendment restrictions by whether such restrictions are narrowly
tailored to the government interest. The Fifth Circuit did not specify
whether that government interest needs to be compelling, important,
or merely legitimate (in fact, the court did not even mention the term
"government interest"). But its use of the term "narrowly tailored"
implies that the Second-Amendment restriction must be narrowly
tailored in relation to the government interest it is meant to achieve. A
restriction simply cannot be narrowly tailored in a vacuum; rather, the
adequacy of its tailoring can only be assessed in relation to its
purpose. The Fifth Circuit's standard of scrutiny also requires the
Second-Amendment restriction to be "reasonable and not inconsistent
with the right of Americans generally to individually keep and bear
their private arms as historically understood in this country."
58
Professor Adam Winkler criticizes the Fifth Circuit's standard of
scrutiny in Emerson, stating that it "confuses more than it clarifies. 59
Specifically, he points to the schizophrenic use of the terms "narrowly
tailored" and "reasonable" in the same sentence-one a catchphrase
for an exacting, heightened scrutiny, and the other a buzzword for
a deferential, rational-basis-type scrutiny. However, the term
56 See Brief for the Nat'l Rifle Ass'n and the NRA Civil Rights Defense Fund as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 16-26, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783
(2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 354081, at * 16-26 [hereinafter NRA Brief].
57 Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261 (second and third emphasis added).
58 Id.
59 Winkler, supra note 11, at 691.
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"reasonable restriction" is commonly used in the First-Amendment
context to describe a restriction capable of surviving rigorous
strict-scrutiny analysis. For instance, in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism,60 the Supreme Court stated,
Our cases make clear, however, that even in a public forum
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the
restrictions "are justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.,
61
The Court in Ward used the term "reasonable restrictions" to
identify those restrictions that are constitutional (in part) precisely
because "they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest. 62 Clearly, the Fifth Circuit in Emerson could
have done more to elucidate the applicable standard of scrutiny using
the familiar nomenclature--e.g., strict scrutiny. However, the court's
failure to do so may indicate, not an error, but an attempt to articulate
a novel standard of heightened scrutiny (akin to strict scrutiny)
specifically geared to apply against gun-control laws in the
Second-Amendment context.
The Fifth Circuit subsequently interpreted Emerson's standard of
scrutiny to be something other than strict scrutiny. In United States v.
Darrington,63 the court stated,
Emerson is a carefully and laboriously crafted opinion, and if
it intended to recognize that the individual right to keep and
bear arms is a "fundamental right," in the sense that
restrictions on this right are subject to "strict scrutiny" by the
courts and require a "compelling state interest," it would have
used these constitutional terms of art.64
Emerson is indeed a "carefully and laboriously crafted opinion,, 65 but
the otherwise comprehensive opinion devoted only one sentence to
- 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
61 Id. at 791 (emphasis added) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
62 Id.
63 351 F.3d 632 (5th Cit. 2003).
64 Id. at 635.
65 Id.
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the applicable standard of scrutiny. And although Emerson does not
invoke certain "constitutional terms of art" such as "strict scrutiny" or
"compelling state interest, '66 it does invoke the term "narrowly
tailored" which clearly evinces a heightened and rigorous standard of
scrutiny-analogous to strict scrutiny. Thus, in Emerson, the Fifth
Circuit applied a strict standard of scrutiny.
2. Parker II
In Parker II, the D.C. Circuit also applied a heightened standard of
scrutiny resembling strict scrutiny. However, as in Emerson, the D.C.
Circuit's standard of scrutiny in Parker II is subject to interpretation.
At first glance, Judge Silberman appeared to employ a variation of
the reasonable-regulation standard that state courts use. He stated that
Second-Amendment protections "are subject to the same sort of
reasonable restrictions [time, place, and manner] that ... limit[] ...
the First Amendment., 67 Although First-Amendment rights often
68trigger strict scrutiny, they occasionally trigger a deferential,
rational-basis-type scrutiny.69  Judge Silberman considered a
"reasonable regulation" to be analogous to the common-law
restrictions that limited the pre-existing right to keep and bear
arms-which the Second Amendment merely preserved.70  He
indicated that gun-control laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed
weapons and depriving convicted felons of their right to keep and
bear arms were reasonable and would survive his standard of
scrutiny7T: "These regulations promote the government's interest in
public safety consistent with our common law tradition. Just as
6 Id.
67 Parker v. District of Columbia (Parker I), 478 F.3d 370, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2007), affid
sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
68 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
69 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408-09 (2007) (holding that public school
students' speech rights at official school outings may be limited whenever a reasonable basis
exists for believing the speech advocates illegal drug use); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that public school officials can restrict student speech in the
school newspaper "so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns").
70 Parker l, 478 F.3d at 399.
[T]he right to keep and bear arms-which .. .pre-existed, and therefore was
preserved by, the Second Amendment-was subject to restrictions at common law.
We take these to be the sort of reasonable regulations contemplated by the drafters of
the Second Amendment. For instance, it is presumably reasonable "to prohibit the
carrying of weapons when under the influence of intoxicating drink, or to a church,
polling place, or public assembly, or in a manner calculated to inspire terror ..
Id. (quoting State v. Kemer, 107 S.E. 222, 225 (N.C. 1921)).
71 Id.
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importantly, however, they do not impair the core conduct upon
which the right was premised., 72 Thus, at first blush, Judge Silberman
ostensibly employed a variation of the reasonable-regulation standard
that state courts use.
However, to illustrate that Second-Amendment protections are
subject to reasonable, First-Amendment-type restrictions, Judge
Silberman cited Ward v. Rock Against Racism73 and included the
following parenthetical quotation: "('[G]overnment may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech . . ).,74 Although not included in Judge Silberman's
opinion, the remaining portion of that quote from Ward requires the
"reasonable restrictions" to be "'narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest."'' 75 Thus, in citing Ward, Judge
Silberman uncloaked the true nature of his (strict) standard of
scrutiny-to be constitutional, gun-control laws must be narrowly
tailored to serve a (significant/compelling) government interest.
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg read Judge Silberman's opinion as imposing
a strict standard of scrutiny.76 It is unclear why Judge Silberman did
not explicitly brand his standard as strict scrutiny. Perhaps he felt
such a label was overly simplistic given the intricacies involved in the
Second-Amendment context. Perhaps he considered his standard to be
novel, and avoided the typical nomenclature to forestall confusion.
Regardless, the strict nature of Judge Silberman's standard of scrutiny
is apparent. Thus, in Parker II, the D.C. Circuit applied a strict
standard of scrutiny.
3. Roy Lucas
Roy Lucas argues that courts should apply strict scrutiny against
gun-control laws.77 In doing so, he finds a concomitant link between
the "fundamental right to protect and defend the home and family"
and the fundamental Second-Amendment right to keep and bear
arms.
78
72 Id.
73 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
74 See Parker II, 478 F.3d at 399 (alteration in original) (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
75 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) ("Our cases make clear, however, that even in a public
forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
protected speech, provided ... they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest .... (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 53, at 43-45.
77 See Lucas, supra note 55, at 327-30.
78 Id. at 327.
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The rounding up of guns from private homes, facilitated
by gun registration, leaves families defenseless against
burglary, gangs, looting, violent civil disorder, and terror ....
* . . Such registration leads directly to confiscation and
disarmament based upon mere defensive possession. It
satisfies no compelling interest.
* . . The Second Amendment embodies a fundamental
policy against citizen disarmament. "The framers . . . had a
keen appreciation of the peril of being defenseless. 79
Lucas cites Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in Troxel v.
Granville8° for the proposition that "'strict scrutiny [applies] to
infringements of fundamental rights.' ' '8' He claims that applying a
strict standard of scrutiny against gun-control laws "would clarify
Second[-]Amendment jurisprudence immensely and align it with
First[-]Amendment practice that is closely analogous. 82 And he
contends that strict scrutiny is especially appropriate in the Second-
Amendment context "to avoid leaps of illogic and unjust treatment of
defendants for acts and omissions that are miles distant from criminal
activity, such as mere possession of a firearm that has legitimate
,,83defensive uses.
Unfortunately, Lucas' analysis-although germane-is cursory,
spanning only a few pages in a seventy-plus-page article. But it does
serve as an introduction to the arguments in favor of a Second-
Amendment strict-scrutiny standard.
4. National Rifle Association's Amicus Brief in Heller
In Heller, the National Rifle Association ("NRA") submitted an
amicus brief in which it urges the Supreme Court to subject
gun-control laws to strict scrutiny.84 In doing so, the NRA argues the
Second Amendment protects a fundamental right.85
79 Id. at 328 (last omission in original) (quoting Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 569-70
(9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
8 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
S Lucas, supra note 55, at 328-29 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
82 Id. at 329.
83 Id.
84 See NRA Brief, supra note 56, at 16-26, 20-21 ("[L]aws infringing the Second
Amendment should be the subject of strict scrutiny by a reviewing court, not the lower levels of
scrutiny sought by petitioners, their supporting amici, and the United States.").
85 Id. at 16-21.
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Recognizing "that not all laws restricting 'fundamental' rights are
subjected to strict scrutiny," the NRA distinguishes between two
types of fundamental rights: (1) those "rights that are fundamental to
democratic self-government[-]such as political speech and the right
of the people to keep and bear arms"; and (2) those rights that are
"fundamental to the American system of justice"-such as the
"criminal justice and due process provisions in the Bill of Rights. 86
Courts apply strict scrutiny to laws burdening the former (i.e., rights
fundamental to democratic self-government).87 But courts apply
various tests to laws burdening the latter (i.e., rights fundamental to
the American system of justice).88
Upon distinguishing between the two types of fundamental
rights, the NRA argues Second-Amendment rights are fundamental
to democratic self-government because of the "explicit
connection between the right to keep and bear arms and the
preservation of democratic self-government., 89 Thus, because the
Second-Amendment right to arms is fundamental to democratic
self-government, the NRA argues courts should apply strict scrutiny
against gun-control laws.
B. Semi-Strict Scrutiny
Calvin Massey argues that courts should apply a "'semi-strict'
[standard of] scrutiny" against gun-control laws that materially
infringe upon the "individual right to armed self-defense."
90
However, if the gun-control law does not constitute a material
infringement, then presumably a deferential standard of scrutiny
applies-not semi-strict scrutiny. The fundamental question is
whether the particular regulation constitutes a material infringement.
To address this fundamental question, Massey states, "[M]ost
regulations that are short of absolute prohibitions will likely be found
86 Id. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 See Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 227, 229 (2006) ("Laws invading on First Amendment rights of speech,
association, and religious liberty are often subject to strict scrutiny, as are laws that restrict the
due process and (invisible) equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.").
88 Id. ("[Sitrict scrutiny is nowhere to be found in the jurisprudence of... the Third
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment, the
Eighth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, or the Tenth Amendment."). In the
Fourth-Amendment context, courts apply a reasonableness test to unreasonable searches and
seizures; in the Sixth-Amendment context, courts apply categorical rules to implement the right
to counsel; in the Eighth-Amendment context, courts apply categorical rules against cruel and
unusual punishments and excessive bail and fImes. Id at 229-31.
89 NRA Brief, supra note 56, at 17-21.
90 Massey, supra note 6, at 1133, 1125-33.
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not to be material infringements." 91 In an effort to further define
"material infringement," Massey lists the following categories of
regulation as examples of non-material infringements: (1) regulations
that deny certain people-e.g., minors, convicted criminals, and the
insane-their Second-Amendment right to possess arms; (2)
regulations that ban certain categories of weapons-e.g., handguns
equipped with silencers, automatic weapons, grenade launchers,
artillery, rockets, tanks, bombs, and weapons of mass destruction; (3)
regulations that limit the number of guns that a given person could
purchase; and (4) regulations that require guns to be equipped with
trigger locks.92 These regulations would not be subject to a
heightened form of scrutiny.
Those categories of regulation that might constitute material
infringements include: (1) regulations that amount to "[a]bsolute
prohibitions upon private possession of handguns, shotguns, [or]
rifles"; and (2) regulations that impose certain forms of licensing
systems.93 The materiality of the former category "depends upon the
utility of the weapon in question." 94 The materiality of the latter
category "depends upon the standards employed to limit the
discretion of the licensing authority." 95
If a particular gun-control law materially infringes the underlying
right, then Massey applies a semi-strict standard of scrutiny to vet the
law's constitutionality. Under this standard, "The government [is]
required to prove that its chosen means, in purpose and in fact,
substantially advance the government's compelling objective., 96 This
is a more lenient standard than strict scrutiny because it does not
require the government "to prove that its choice of means is the least
restrictive alternative available to it."
97
C. Intermediate Scrutiny
The United States' amicus brief in Heller urges the Supreme Court
to adopt a "heightened judicial scrutiny" resembling intermediate
scrutiny.98 The impetus for urging this intermediate standard of
91 Id. at 1128 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 1126-27.
93 Id. at 1127-29.
94 Id. at 1127-28 ("If the regulation permits reasonable access to and use of firearms that
are both suited to self-defense and that do not have an inherent risk of collateral damage, the
regulation does not materially impair the individual right of armed self-defense.").
95 Id. at 1128-29 (arguing that unconstrained discretion would be a material infringement;
official discretion-guided by specific criteria-would not be a material infringement).
96 Id. at 1132 (emphasis added).
97 Id.
98 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20-33, District of Columbia v.
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scrutiny is clear: the United States is concerned that a more exacting
standard will render all existing federal firearms laws susceptible to
Second-Amendment challenges. 99 Indeed, since at least 2001, the
United States-through then Attorney General John Ashcroft-
vowed to "defend vigorously the constitutionality, under the Second
Amendment, of all existing federal firearms laws."' 00 The United
States argues that Congress has authority to: (1) prohibit particular
types of firearms; (2) ban the private possession of firearms by
persons unfit to keep such weapons; and (3) regulate the manufacture,
sale, and flow of firearms in commerce. 10'
1. Prohibiting Particular Types of Firearms
The United States contends that the Second Amendment protects a
right to "'keep and bear Arms,' not a right to possess any specific type
of firearm."'1 2 Consequently, a categorical ban on any particular type
of firearm-such as a machine gun-is constitutional, so long as it
survives heightened scrutiny. 0 3 The United States objects to the D.C.
Circuit's "categorical test."' 4 But the D.C. Circuit did not create this
"categorical test," it merely applied the test that the Supreme Court
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157201, at *20-33 [hereinafter U.S.
Brief]. The U.S. Brief argued "there would be virtue in remanding the case for application of a
proper standard of review and permitting Second Amendment doctrine to develop in an
incremental and prudent fashion as is necessary to decide particular cases that may arise." Id. at
29.
99 Congress has enacted numerous laws governing the sale, transportation, and possession
of various categories of firearms. For example, Congress has generally prohibited the private
possession of particularly dangerous types of firearms. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2006)
(machineguns); 18 U.S.C. § 922(p) (2006) (firearms that are undetectable by metal detectors or
x-ray machines). Federal law also restricts the possession of firearms by various categories of
individuals whom Congress has deemed unfit to possess such weapons. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) (2006) (prohibiting the possession of firearms by: any person convicted of a crime
punishable by a prison term exceeding one year; fugitives from justice; unlawful users of
controlled substances; persons who have renounced their U.S. citizenship; persons subject to
retraining orders; and persons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence). In
addition, Congress has prohibited the private possession of firearms at particular locations. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 930 (2006) (federal government facilities); 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1)(A) (Supp.
V 2005) (Capitol Grounds and Capitol Buildings); 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b)(1) (2000) (concealed
dangerous weapon when on---or attempting to get on-an aircraft). Federal law also regulates
the manufacture, sale, and importation of firearms. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 923 (2006) (requiring a
license to engage in business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms); 18 U.S.C §
922(a) (2006) (listing unlawful acts for non-licensed persons); 18 U.S.C § 922(1) (2006)
(restricting the importation of firearms).
10 Memorandum from John Ashcrofl, U.S. Attorney General, to all United States'
Attorneys (Nov. 9, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/emerson.htm.
101 U.S. Brief, supra note 98, at 21-27.
I021d, at 22.
103 Id.
1041Id. at 2 1.
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created in United States v. Miller.10 5 Applying this test, 10 6 the D.C.
Circuit determined that the modem handgun at issue "passes Miller's
standards," and therefore constitutes an "Arm" under the Second
Amendment. 0 7 Judge Silberman then concluded, "Once it is
determined-as we have done-that handguns are 'Arms' referred
to in the Second Amendment, it is not open to the District to
ban them."' 1 8  Of course, the District is free to regulate
Second-Amendment arms, but it cannot ban them outright.
The United States apparently objects to the Miller test, or at least
to the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Miller. And it urges the
Supreme Court to (effectively overrule Miller and) adopt a form of
heightened scrutiny-i.e., a balancing test-to determine the
constitutionality of a categorical ban on a particular type of
weapon. 109 The United States' balancing test considers: (1) whether
the "firearm is commonly possessed"; (2) whether the firearm "poses
specific dangers, or has unique uses"; and (3) whether "functional
alternatives" are available."1 0
2. Banning the Private Possession of Firearms by Persons Unfit to
Keep Such Weapons
The United States argues, "Heightened judicial scrutiny is not
appropriate for all laws regulating the possession of firearms.
'' H!
Certain individuals "fall outside the protection of the Second
Amendment," 2-_e.g., felons" 3 and the insane."l4 The United States
contends that heightened scrutiny should not apply to federal laws
banning certain categories of individuals from privately possessing
firearms, so long as the ban has a "Framing-era analog.""' 5 For
105307 U.S. 174 (1939).
10 6 The Miller test consists of two prongs for a firearm to fall under the Second
Amendment's protective umbrella: (1) it must bear a "'reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,' because [it is] the very [type of] arm[]
needed for militia service"; and (2) it must "be personally owned and 'of the kind in common
use at the time."' Parker v. District of Columbia (Parker I), 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79), aff'd sub noma. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008).
10 7 Parker ], 478 F.3d at 398.
1Old. at 400 (emphasis added) ("'To exclude all pistols ... is not a regulation, but a
prohibition, of... "arms" which the people are entitled to bear."' (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Kemer, 107 S.E. 222, 225 (N.C. 1921))).
109 U.S. Brief, supra note 98, at 22.
1l1d
.
MId. at25.
112 Id
.
113 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
114 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2006).
I's U.S. Brief, supra note 98, at 26 n.7.
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instance, at common law, felons did not enjoy the right to possess
arms; thus, section 922(g)(1)'s ban on firearm possession by felons
would not be subject to heightened scrutiny." 6 However, if a federal
law prohibited a particular group from possessing firearms "in the
absence of a Framing-era analog, [that federal law] would be subject
to [heightened] scrutiny.""' 7
3. Regulating the Manufacture, Sale, and Flow of Firearms in
Commerce
The United States argues that federal licensing provisions or
federal limits on importing or transporting firearms are
constitutional. 1 8 However, it acknowledges, "this case, which
involves private possession, provides no opportunity for the Court to
expound on the different principles that might govern efforts to
regulate the commercial trade in firearms."' 19
D. Reasonable-Regulation Scrutiny
Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Adam Winkler's amicus brief
in Heller urges the Supreme Court-should it interpret the Second
Amendment as protecting an individual right-to adopt the
reasonable-regulation standard. 120 They beseech the Supreme Court to
look to the beacon of "well developed and comprehensive"
state-court jurisprudence regarding the right to bear arms.'2 ' In doing
so, they cite Winkler's article on Second-Amendment judicial review
in which he claims, "Forty-two states have constitutional provisions
guaranteeing an individual right to bear arms and, tellingly, the
courts of every state to consider the question apply a deferential
'reasonable regulation' standard in arms rights cases., 122 Of course,
as Professor Glenn Reynolds notes, "This statement, while not
exactly inaccurate, is incomplete."'123 But, regardless, in the realm of
state-court right-to-bear-arms jurisprudence, reasonable-regulation
scrutiny is the norm, if not the uniform standard.
"
6 1d. at 25-26.
117Id. at 26 n.7.
1iId. at 26-27.
19 ld at 27.
120Brief of Law Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Adam Winkler, as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290),
2008 WL 157186 [hereinafter Chemerinsky & Winkler Brief].
12 1 Id. at5.
122 Winkler, supra note 11, at 686 (footnote omitted).
23 Reynolds, supra note 11, at 138 ("One of the best known and most important lines of
state right-to-arms cases does not comfortably fit this characterization." (citing Andrews v.
State, 50 Tenn. 165 (Tenn. 1871) and Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (Tenn. 1840))).
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The difference between reasonable-regulation scrutiny and
rational-basis scrutiny is slight; and, in operational effect, the
difference is negligible. Rational-basis scrutiny asks whether the
gun-control law is a rational means to achieve a legitimate
governmental end.12 4  This level of scrutiny is "enormously
deferential to the government."'' 25 The analysis focuses upon the
relationship between the law and its intended purpose-the effect
upon the individual claiming a right to bear arms is not considered.
Reasonable-regulation scrutiny, however, asks whether the
gun-control law is "a 'reasonable' limitation on the right to bear
arms.q 126 The analysis purportedly focuses upon the extent to which
the law burdens the right. In applying this standard, courts ostensibly
seek to "balance the conflicting rights of an individual to keep and
bear arms for lawful purposes against the authority of the State to
exercise its police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
its citizens." 127 But as Winkler observes, the "balancing is decidedly
tipped in favor of the government, so much so that the individual
almost never wins. 1 28 Thus, despite the apparent change in focus,
both standards-in operational effect-are extremely deferential.
And, under the reasonable-regulation standard, a gun-control law
generally will survive scrutiny unless that law effectively
"eviscerates" the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. 129
Professors Chemerinsky and Winkler's amicus brief implores the
Court to adopt the reasonable-regulation standard for three principle
reasons: (1) gun-control laws are "legitimate means of enhancing
public safety, reducing crime, [and] protecting children ... [thus] the
predicate for heightened scrutiny is absent"; (2) "[T]he text of the
Second Amendment, the history of the right to bear arms in federal
and state constitutional law, and federalism values all support
permitting legislators substantial latitude to adopt reasonable
regulations of arms"; and (3) "[E]ven if the Court concludes that the
right to keep and bear arms is a 'fundamental' right[,] [n]ot all
124 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 540.
125 Id.
126Jeffrey Monks, Comment, The End of Gun Control or Protection Against
Tyranny?: The Impact of the New Wisconsin Constitutional Right to Bear Arms on State Gun
Control Laws, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 249, 275 n.147 (2001).
127 State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 800 (Wis. 2003).
128 Winkler, supra note 11, at 717-18.
129 Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d at 799 ("Case law reveals that while the right to bear arms for
lawful purposes is not an absolute, neither is the State's police power when it eviscerates this
constitutionally protected right."); see also Winkler, supra note 11, at 717 ("State courts explain
that the difference between reasonable and unreasonable regulation of the arms right is that any
law that 'eviscerates,' renders 'nugatory,' or results in the effective 'destruction' of the right is
unreasonable." (footnotes omitted)).
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fundamental rights trigger heightened scrutiny and many are
governed by reasonableness tests or other forms of relatively
deferential scrutiny. '' 30
E. Rational-Basis Scrutiny
As previously mentioned, the difference between rational-basis
scrutiny and the reasonable-regulation standard is negligible; although
proponents of the latter claim it is (vaguely) more stringent than the
former. Under either standard, nearly all gun-control laws survive
judicial review.
III. PROPOSED SECOND-AMENDMENT STANDARD OF SCRUTINY
The Supreme Court should find that the Second-Amendment right
to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right. And the Court should
require courts to subject gun-control laws to strict-scrutiny analysis.
A. A Fundamental Right to Keep and Bear Arms
"The Supreme Court has held that some liberties are so important
that they are deemed to be 'fundamental rights' .... 9,,3 1Generally,
the government cannot infringe upon fundamental rights unless the
transgression survives strict-scrutiny analysis. Some fundamental
rights are expressly provided for in the Constitution-e.g., the
First-Amendment right to freedom of speech is an express
fundamental right. 32  Other fundamental rights are implied
through the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and/or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment-e.g., the right to privacy is an implied fundamental
right.1 33 The Supreme Court should find that the Second-Amendment
right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right because (1) it
is uniquely and inextricably intertwined with the fundamental
First-Amendment right to engage in political speech, and (2) it is
inseparable from what the Framers called "the first law of nature": the
right of self-preservation.' 
34
13 0 Chemerinsky & Winkler Brief, supra note 120, at 1-4.
131 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 792.
132 See id.
133Id at 792-93.
134 See, e.g., Samuel Adams, The Rights of the Colonists: Report of the Committee of
Correspondence to the Boston Town Meeting, 7 OLD SOUTH LEAFLETS 417 (No. 173) (Burt
Franklin 1970) (1772).
Among the natural rights of the Colonists are these: First, a right to life; Secondly, to
liberty; Thirdly, to property; together with the right to support and defend them in the
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1. Nexus Between the Second Amendment and the Fundamental
First-Amendment Right to Engage in Political Speech
In determining what the appropriate Second-Amendment standard
of scrutiny should be-and whether the right to keep and bear arms is
a fundamental right-it is helpful to compare the Second Amendment
with the other constitutional provision to which it is most analogous:
the First Amendment. The right to keep and bear arms is uniquely and
inextricably intertwined with the fundamental First-Amendment right
to engage in political speech. Thus, the Supreme Court should
recognize the Second-Amendment right to keep and bear arms as a
fundamental right.
There are four major theories addressing why the right to freedom
of speech is protected as a fundamental right: "freedom of speech is
protected [1] to further self-governance, [2] to aid the discovery of
truth via the marketplace of ideas, [3] to promote autonomy, and [4]
to foster tolerance."'' 35 Of these four rationales, the self-governance
rationale is the most relevant to the Second-Amendment inquiry. The
premise of the self-governance rationale is that the First-Amendment
freedom of speech is critical in a democracy. 36 Professor Vincent
Blasi argues political speech serves as an indispensable check against
government misconduct. 37 He writes, "[government misconduct] is
so antithetical to the entire political arrangement, is so harmful to
individual people, and also is so likely to occur, that its prevention
and containment is a goal that takes precedence over all other goals of
the political system."'' 38 Indeed, political speech "is at the very core of
the First Amendment. [And] [i]f there is a hierarchy of protected
speech, political speech occupies the top rung.' 139 Thus, because
political speech provides a necessary check against government
misconduct, the First Amendment is deemed fundamental, and courts
subject political-speech restrictions to strict scrutiny.
best manner they can. These are evident branches of, rather than deductions from,
the duty of self-preservation, commonly called the first law of nature.
Id.
'
35 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 926.
136 See id. ("Open discussions of candidates is essential for voters to make informed
selections in elections; it is through speech that people can influence their government's choice
of policies; public officials are held accountable through criticisms that can pave the way for
their replacement.").
37 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 523.
1381d. at 558.
139CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 1070.
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The Second-Amendment right to keep and bear arms is uniquely
and inextricably intertwined with political speech. It is axiomatic that
"tyranny thrives best where government need not fear the wrath of an
armed people.' 140 There is ample evidence of this axiom in our own
history. "[D]uring the Jim crow era... gun[-]control laws were used
to help secure [the] political subordination" of black slaves. 14'
Disarmament was the tool of choice for subjugating both
slaves and free blacks in the South. In Florida, patrols
searched blacks' homes for weapons, confiscated those found
and punished their owners without judicial process. In the
North, by contrast, blacks exercised their right to bear arms to
defend against racial mob violence. 1
42
In Dred Scott v. Sandford,43 the Supreme Court ruled black slaves
could never attain citizenship because-among a parade of
horribles--citizenship would give blacks the right to "keep and carry
arms wherever they went." 144 The possibility of "four million armed
blacks" 145 was not just anathema to the prevailing prejudices of the
time; rather, that possibility threatened the institution of slavery itself,
because an armed population is not easily oppressed.
This connection between disarmament and political oppression is
seen throughout history: "Stalin's atrocities, the killing fields of
Cambodia, [and] the Holocaust[-]to name but a few-were [all]
perpetrated by armed troops against unarmed populations."1 46 One
would hope the mechanisms of our constitutional republic are
sufficient to forestall the need for armed-citizen resistance against a
tyrannical government seeking to quell political opposition. But
however unlikely the need for an armed-citizen resistance is, it is not
beyond the realm of possibility.1 47 This is why Judge Kozinski
characterized the Second Amendment as a "doomsday provision...
designed for those exceptionally rare circumstances ...where the
140 Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
141 Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REv. 103, 116 (1987).
142Silveira, 328 F.3d at 569 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(citations omitted).
143 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
14Id. at 417.
145 Silveira, 328 F.3d at 569 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
1461d. at 569-70.
147 See id. at 570 ("However improbable these contingencies may seem today, facing them
unprepared is a mistake a free people get to make only once.").
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government refuses to stand for reelection and silences those who
protest."'
148
Because the Second-Amendment right to keep and bear arms
is inextricably intertwined with the fundamental right to
engage in political speech-which lies at the core of the First
Amendment-Second-Amendment rights should be recognized as
fundamental.
2. Nexus Between the Second Amendment and the First Right of
Nature: the Right of Self-Preservation
The Second-Amendment right to keep and bear arms is inseparable
from what the Framers called the "first law of nature": the
natural right of self-preservation. 149 "In liberal theory, the right to
self-defense is the most fundamental of all rights-far more basic
than the guarantees of free speech, freedom of religion, jury trial, and
due process of law."'150 Indeed, Thomas Hobbes wrote of "the Liberty
each man hath, to use his own power. . . for the preservation of his
own Nature ... his own Life."'' John Locke thought it "reasonable
and just I should have a Right to destroy that which threatens me
with Destruction."' 52 William Blackstone considered the right of
self-defense to be "the primary law of nature" and proclaimed the
right to self-defense could not be "taken away by the law of
society."' 5 3 And Alexander Hamilton regarded the "original right
of self-defense . . . [as] paramount to all positive forms of
government." 1
54
Liberal theory had an unquestionable and well-documented
influence on the Constitution's framing. And the axiomatic right of
self-preservation, ubiquitous in the writings of liberal theorists-such
as Hobbes, Locke, Blackstone, Hamilton, and Adams-not only
preexisted our Constitution, but was arguably embedded into it, either
through the Second Amendment or through the realization that this
first right of nature could not be "taken away [or established] by the
law of society." For instance, consider the fact that "At the time of the
founding, organized police forces had not yet been developed.'
155
148 Id.
149 See Adams, supra note 134, at 417.
150 Lund, supra note 141, at 118.
151 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651).
152 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 296 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
153 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4.
5 THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 130 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
155 Lund, supra note 141, at 118.
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Without an organized police force, ordinary Americans were left (and
expected) to defend themselves and maintain order. Moreover, the
common-law doctrine of self-defense is predicated on the principle
that individuals have a natural right to self-preservation. This right of
self-preservation is undoubtedly fundamental, even if the Supreme
Court has not yet recognized it as such among the panoply of
fundamental rights.
The (fundamental) right of self-preservation is inseparable from
the Second-Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Indeed, if an
individual were unable to keep and bear arms to defend himself or
herself, then the natural right of self-preservation would be a hollow
ideal, completely devoid of any meaning. Certainly, governments
have an interest in mitigating the undesirable consequences of
an armed populace. But given the preeminent importance of the
natural right of self-preservation-which is inseparable from the
Second-Amendment right to keep and bear arms-the Supreme Court
should find that the Second-Amendment right to keep and bear arms
is fundamental.
Thus, the Supreme Court should find that the Second-Amendment
right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right-because it is
(1) inextricably intertwined with the fundamental right to engage in
political speech, and (2) inseparable from the natural right of
self-preservation.
B. Second-Amendment Strict Scrutiny
In addition to ruling that the individual right to keep and bear arms
is fundamental, the Supreme Court should require courts to apply a
strict standard of scrutiny against gun-control laws. Generally, the
government cannot infringe upon fundamental rights unless the
transgression survives strict-scrutiny analysis. 156 Indeed, in Troxel v.
Granville, 57 Justice Thomas stated he "would apply strict scrutiny to
infringements of fundamental rights.' 58 And in United States v.
Virginia,159 Justice Scalia indicated "strict scrutiny [should] be
applied to the deprivation of whatever sort of right we consider
'fundamental."", 160 Of course, Professors Chemerinsky and Winkler's
amicus brief in Heller notes that not all fundamental rights are subject
to strict scrutiny.' 6' But the NRA's amicus brief clarifies the issue:
156 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 792.
157 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
158 Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
159518 U.S. 515 (1996).
16Md. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161 See Chemerinsky & Winkler Brief, supra note 120, at 25-28.
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The amici fail to note the distinction, however, between rights
that are fundamental to democratic self-government, such as
political speech and the right of the people to keep and bear
arms, and those protections of the Bill of Rights that, in the
course of being incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment against the States, were deemed "fundamental"
to the American system of justice. Whatever the varying tests
applied to laws touching on the criminal justice and due
process provisions in the Bill of Rights, laws burdening rights
fundamental to our democracy, such as political speech, are
reviewed under strict scrutiny.
162
Thus, because the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to
democratic self-government-like the right to engage in political
speech-the Supreme Court should require courts to apply strict
scrutiny against gun-control laws.
Under strict scrutiny, a gun-control law is constitutional "if it is
necessary [i.e., narrowly tailored] to achieve a compelling
government purpose.'' 163 And the government bears the burden of
proof. In the context of gun-control legislation, the government's
purpose will typically be rooted in a concern for public safety.
Consequently, the government purpose will always be compelling, so
long as that purpose is not pretextual. The issue will turn on whether
the gun-control law is narrowly tailored to achieve its public-safety
purpose. To be narrowly tailored the law must be the "least
restrictive alternative."
164
A strict standard of scrutiny would not be fatal to all gun-control
legislation. On the contrary, "most existing forms of gun control
would survive such scrutiny because they are sufficiently well
tailored to achieve sufficiently worthy government purposes."
165
But requiring gun-control laws to be narrowly tailored will ensure
that such legislation is adequately precise and not unduly over- or
under-inclusive.
For instance, gun-control laws that deprive convicted felons of
their right to keep and bear arms are woefully over-inclusive because
many felonies-such as securities law violations, obstruction of
justice, perjury, and embezzlement--"do not indicate a propensity for
162 NRA Brief, supra note 56, at 20 (footnote omitted).
163 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 541 (emphasis omitted).
1641Id.
165 Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms Disabilities
and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 157, 189 (1999).
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dangerousness." ' 166 As Professor Winkler notes, "It is hard to imagine
how banning Martha Stewart or Enron's Andrew Fastow from
possessing a gun furthers public safety., 16 7 However, other
felonies-such as aggravated assault, battery, arson, kidnapping, rape,
and murder-do demonstrate a propensity for violence. Gun-control
laws that deprive convicted felons of their Second-Amendment right
to keep and bear arms should be narrowly tailored to affect only those
felons who committed felonies that demonstrate a propensity for
violence.
Although some gun-control laws might need to be more precisely
tailored, Professor Winkler admits, "[S]trict scrutiny in the context
of gun regulation will not be overwhelmingly fatal and might
even permit most, if not all, gun control laws to survive judicial
review."' 168 But even if a strict standard of scrutiny would be fatal to a
particular gun-control law or even all gun-control laws-which it
would not be-a result-oriented approach to the Second-Amendment
standard-of-scrutiny issue is inappropriate. In other words, it would
be entirely incongruous-if not unconstitutional-for the Supreme
Court to select an applicable standard of scrutiny by speculating as to
the corresponding results and choosing a particular standard based on
which corresponding result is most (subjectively) desirable. If the
Supreme Court interprets the Second Amendment as protecting an
individual right, and deems that right to be fundamental-not just to
the American system of justice but to democratic self-government and
individual self-preservation-then the Supreme Court should require
courts to apply strict scrutiny against gun-control legislation,
irrespective of the result.
CONCLUSION
There are essentially two sides in the gun-control debate: (1) those
who regard gun ownership as a fundamental right, and view guns as
both a symbol and an implement of individual freedom; and (2) those
who regard guns as instruments of death, and gun control as a
necessary means of protecting public safety. The debate has focused
almost exclusively on the nature of the right that the Second
Amendment guarantees. Those who seek to preserve their
Second-Amendment right to keep and bear arms advocate for the
individual-rights interpretation. Those who seek to achieve the
wholesale disarmament of the American people-or at least pervasive
166 Winkler, supra note 11, at 721.
167 Id
.
168 Id. at 730.
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and stifling gun-control laws-advocate for the collective-rights
approach.
If the Supreme Court interprets the Second Amendment as
protecting an individual right (as it seems poised to do), then the
standard-of-review debate will simply rehash the nature-of-the-right
debate. In other words, individual-rights advocates will prefer an
exacting, heightened standard of scrutiny, and collective-rights
advocates will favor a deferential standard of scrutiny. But the
Supreme Court should not indulge in a result-oriented approach to the
Second-Amendment standard-of-scrutiny issue.
Rather, if the Court endorses the individual-rights interpretation, it
should then examine whether the individual right to keep and bear
arms is fundamental. The Supreme Court should find that the
Second-Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental
right because (1) it is uniquely and inextricably intertwined with the
fundamental First-Amendment right to engage in political speech, and
(2) it is inseparable from what the Framers called "the first law
of nature": the right of self-preservation. And because the right to
keep and bear arms is fundamental to democratic self-government
and individual self-preservation-not merely to the American system
of justice-the Supreme Court should require courts to subject
gun-control laws to strict-scrutiny analysis.
Although a result-oriented approach is inappropriate, the
corresponding implications of each standard are apparent. A
deferential standard-such as reasonable-regulation scrutiny-would
be inimical to the individual Second-Amendment right to keep and
bear arms. It would render the individual right to keep and bear arms
illusory, as nearly all gun-control laws would survive judicial review.
A deferential standard would also embolden legislatures, inviting a
barrage of nonsensical gun-control laws poorly tailored to further
public safety. Citizens who wish to possess firearms to protect
themselves and their families-or to contribute a modicum of
potential force to an armed-citizen check against government
misconduct-would be prevented from doing so. All the while,
criminals, delinquents, and other such miscreants who refuse to take
heed of our laws-gun control or otherwise-would continue to be
armed and dangerous.
However, a strict standard of scrutiny will preserve the right of
individual law-abiding citizens to defend themselves and their
families. It will also help to maintain an armed-citizen check on
government misconduct. Under strict scrutiny, the government will
bear the burden of proving that a gun-control law is narrowly tailored
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to achieve its public-safety purpose. This standard will (1) eliminate
those gun-control laws that defy logic, (2) encourage legislatures to
draft precise limitations that are not too burdensome, and (3) preserve
those laws which are narrowly tailored, effective, and wise. Strict
scrutiny is the only standard capable of achieving the proper balance
in the gun-control debate.
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